HSE principal inspector Amy Kalay explains how a wall collapse at a metal recycling site in Birmingham left five workers dead and two company directors facing nine months in jail.
On 7 July 2016, five agency workers were part of a team clearing swarf from a metal recycling bay at a site operated by Hawkeswood Metal Recycling Ltd and Shredmet Ltd (now operating as Ensco 10101 Ltd) in Birmingham. Around 15 minutes after the men started work, the 12ft-high, 45-tonne wall of the bay – made up of 30 concrete blocks – collapsed, killing the men instantly.
We spoke to Health and Safety Executive (HSE) principal inspector Amy Kalay about how this terrible tragedy came to happen.
THE INCIDENT
‘Hawkeswood Metal Recycling Ltd and Shredmet Ltd occupied the site in the Nechells area of Aston in Birmingham. Hawkeswood had been there for at least 15 years collecting, processing and then selling on scrap metal, while Shredmet had been on the site for about eight years,’ Amy said.
‘Originally Shredmet’s involvement in the business had been just buying and selling scrap – it wasn’t involved in processing it. However, by May 2016, Shredmet claimed it was in the process of taking over the production side of the business.
‘On the 7 July 2016, several agency staff and one direct employee had been tasked with clearing swarf – metal filings – out of bay 4 to make way for new material that was going to be stored there. The workers arrived at the site at around 7.30 to 8am and Shredmet director Graham Woodhouse gave them their instructions. One of the operatives, the direct employee, was due to operate a Bobcat and he needed the agency workers to go into the bay with brooms and shovels and deposit the swarf from the floor into the Bobcat bucket.
‘Separating bay 4 from bay 3 – which contained 263 tonnes of metal briquettes – was a concrete wall. This was six courses high and was made from 30 concrete blocks, known as “V-blocks” that are designed to slot together. Each of these blocks is the size of a domestic fridge-freezer and weighs the same as a large family car.
‘As the workers were removing the metal swarf from the floor of bay 4, the fully laden 45-tonne wall with 263 tonnes of metal briquettes behind it collapsed in its entirety. Unfortunately, five of the men – Ousmane Kaba Diaby, Saibo Sumbundu Sillah, Bangally Tunkara Dukuray, Almamo Kinteh Jammeh and Mahamadou Jagana Jagana – were unable to move out of the way and died instantly. A sixth man was able to pin himself against the far right corner of wall, suffering quite significant leg injuries.
‘Another agency worker had just stepped outside of the bay to sweep material which had been spilt there, and another had gone to get more brooms, so it potentially could have been eight deaths rather than five.
‘I have been with the HSE for 22 years and this is the most horrific incident that I have ever been involved in.’
THE INVESTIGATION
‘We ascertained which HSE general inspectors were available and also which specialist inspectors we needed – for example, we knew at that point that the wall had collapsed, so we knew we would need structural engineers,’ Amy told IOSH magazine.
‘Then we sent a team to the site that same afternoon to support the rescue team. Initially, it was about letting the fire service and rescue team do what they needed to do while we assessed the situation. At that point, I don’t think even the people who owned and operated the site knew exactly how many agency staff were still underneath the rubble – it was a case of being able to account for everybody else other than five people.
‘HSE structural engineers attended the site on the same day, to offer support to general inspectors and rescue teams and also assess the safety of other walls at the site. There were several concerns raised – there was one wall that was 11 courses high which was curved and leaning – and a lot of the bays had material stored above the level of the wall height. None of the bays had been assessed by the firms operating the site in terms of their walls and the materials that could be stored safely in them.’
What followed was a lengthy and complex investigation.
‘In accordance with the work-related death protocol, the police led the investigation to see whether there was any culpability in relation to corporate manslaughter or gross negligence manslaughter until the end of 2017,’ Amy continued.
‘We supported the police-led investigation for 18 months, assuming primacy of the investigation at the end of 2017, where we reviewed the material that had been gathered by the police. We then had to wait until the inquest was held at the end of 2018 – another 12 months. ‘The inquest highlighted some lines of enquiry that we needed to follow, and further statements were required from several of the witnesses due to the additional evidence they had given during the inquest.
‘Other aspects that contributed to the investigation’s complexity were considerations of other parties who may have contributed to the failings that led to the tragic incident. Our investigation found that other parties had complied with their legal duties and therefore our investigation was targeted at those directly responsible for managing health and safety at the site.’
THE FINDINGS
‘We found that the companies involved – Hawkeswood, who had originally built the block wall; and Shredmet, who had inherited the business – had both failed to adequately assess the risks associated with the construction of that block wall in terms of its height and width. More importantly, both failed to calculate how much material could be stored against the wall,’ Amy said.
‘Because of that failure, the operatives at the site were not given the appropriate information, instruction or training about how much material could be stored in each of the bays. CCTV footage shown in court showed how machinery had been used on the incident morning to push the briquettes into bay 3, compacting them further and increasing the lateral load on the walls. Then, because of the removal of all the material in bay 4, there was no returning force on the other side, meaning that at some point the wall was going to collapse as it had been overloaded.
‘This was a case of all involved failing to properly risk assess, failing to understand the amount of material that could be stored within the bay, and as a result, failing to properly inform and instruct and train the operatives to ensure work was carried out in a safe manner.’
WHAT SHOULD HAVE HAPPENED?
‘When the concrete blocks were originally purchased, Wayne Hawkeswood – the director who was responsible for procuring the blocks – ought to have given careful consideration to the construction of the bay walls he intended to build from the blocks and whether he required assistance from others. The block supplier had directed other purchasers of the blocks to a structural engineering company, and this is something that was available to Mr Hawkeswood had he sought advice from the supplier,’ Amy said.
‘Even if he didn’t ask the supplier, he could have instructed an expert who understood structural stability and loading to help him build the wall. That was a key failing because neither the companies nor the individuals controlling those companies gave any thought to how to construct the wall properly. All they did was base the wall construction on a leaflet that was provided by the block supplier, where blocks were stacked five courses high. However, our inspectors found that several walls around the site had been constructed in excess of five courses – in one case a bay wall was 11 courses high.
‘There was a serious lack of foresight for what was seemingly such an obvious risk. Even a child in kindergarten will know how high they can stack bricks before the bricks fall over. This was the same thing on a much larger scale and, at some point, that wall was going to fall. But that obvious risk wasn’t something that was ever appreciated by anybody managing that site.’
THE PROSECUTION
In November 2022, after a five-week trial at Birmingham Crown Court, Wayne Anthony Hawkeswood and Graham John Woodhouse were both found guilty of four charges each – failing to discharge the duty to which they were subject by virtue of ss 2(1) and 3(1) of the Health and Safety at Work Act 1974. Hawkeswood Metal Recycling Limited and Ensco 10101 Limited (known at the time as Shredmet Ltd) were also found guilty of two identical counts bringing the total number of convictions to 12.
On Monday, 15 May, again at Birmingham Crown Court, Hawkeswood and Woodhouse each received nine-month custodial sentences. Hawkeswood Metal Recycling was fined £1m while Ensco 10101 Limited was ordered pay £600,000. The judge also ordered £775,000 to be paid in prosecution costs.
LESSONS FOR IOSH MEMBERS
‘Every employer has a duty to manage the health and safety of those they employ or those who may be affected by their undertakings. It’s really important that they assess the risks and take action where they have identified that control measures are needed,’ Amy said.
‘More importantly, I’d advise IOSH members to look holistically at the general risks at your business and make sure that you really do consider these obvious risks, and then do something about them. The importance of managing your site isn’t applicable just to the waste and recycling industry but applies to all sectors.
‘While no sentence will ever equal the losses felt by the families involved in this case, the nine-month custodial sentences in this prosecution should send out a really clear message to industry of the consequences of not complying with legal duties placed upon them. HSE will not hesitate to take action against those who fail to protect their workers.’